Federal Jurisdiction -- A Restriction on the Application of Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act by Kirkpatrick, James W., Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 37 | Number 4 Article 9
6-1-1959
Federal Jurisdiction -- A Restriction on the
Application of Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley
Act
James W. Kirkpatrick Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
James W. Kirkpatrick Jr., Federal Jurisdiction -- A Restriction on the Application of Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 37 N.C. L. Rev.
500 (1959).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol37/iss4/9
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Federal Jurisdiction-A Restriction on the Application of
Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act
When does section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act confer juris-
diction on the federal courts?' The act on its face confers jurisdiction
over all suits between labor unions and employers, for breaches of col-
lective bargaining contracts, whether the benefits of the suit inure pri-
marily to the employer, the union or the individual employee. However,
a study of the cases shows that the interpretation of section 301(a) of
Taft-Hartley has not proved this simple.
A restrictive interpretation of section 301(a) was first approved
by the Supreme Court in the case of Association of Westinghouse
Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.2  In that case there
was a dispute over the payment of 4,000 employees who were absent
on a particular day. The employer refused to pay the employees this
day's wages. The union contended that by the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement, unless the absences were "furlough" or "leave of
absence," the company must pay the wages for that day. The union
requested a declaration of rights under the agreement. It was held
that the union was suing for the wages of the employees which was a
"uniquely personal" right of the employees and not one of primary, con-
cern to the union. Section 301 (a) was held to confer federal jurisdic-
tion only when the rights sought to be vindicated were of primary in-
terest to the union. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the court, dis-
cussed at length the constitutional problems of section 301 (a),8 and
I Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act reads in part, "suits for violation
of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees
in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter . .. may be brought
in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties . .. ."
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) § 301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1952).
9348 U.S. 437 (1955).
'The primary constitutional problem raised was whether there was a case
"arising under" the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States when
the Taft-Hartley Act gave the federal courts "bare" jurisdiction, without de-
claring any substantive law. The case of Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448 (1957), dispelled the constitutional problem by directing the lower
federal courts to "fashion a body of federal law" in this area. 353 U.S. at 451.
In view of the fact that the restrictive interpretation of 301(a) originated as a
briefly considered escape from constitutional issues, which have now been settled,
the future of the Westinghouse limitation is questionable.
The constitutional problems of the Westinghouse and Lincoln Mills cases are
discussed in Note, 36 N.C.L. REV. 215 (1958).
Added doubt is cast upon the force of the Westinghouse decision by the sharp
split of the opinions. Justices Burton and Minton joined Justice Frankfurter
in the constitutional entanglement. In the two concurring decisions, the Chief
Justice and Justices Clark and Reed were not troubled by the constitutional
problems of section 301(a). Rather they would put the decision squarely on the
restrictive interpretation of the statute. Justices Douglas and Black dissented on




clearly indicated that the case was decided upon the restrictive interpre-
tation of this section to avoid a constitutional decision.
It should be noted that the sole reason that Justice Frankfurter
gave for the distinction made in the Westinghouse case was that "no-
where in the legislative history did Congress discuss or show any recog-
nition of the type of suit involved here.. . ."4 In substance this is an
assertion that there is no legislative intention shown. In the absence of
legislative history to the contrary it would seem only reasonable to
follow the plain meaning of the act.5 Section 301 (a) provides that an
action may be brought in the federal court by "a labor organization
representing employees," when there is an industry affecting interstate
commerce. There is no indication that such a representative suit may be
brought only when the union is primarily interested in the results.
An article by Professor Bunn, an eminent authority on federal juris-
diction, suggests additional reasons why the Wistinghouse distinction
is incorrect." His argument is primarily based on the fact that a West-
inghouse limitation of section 301(a) is contrary to Rule 17(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule provides that the real
party in interest must bring the suit. It additionally provides that (1)
when a party has made a contract for the benefit of a third party or (2)
when a statute so authorizes, a party "may sue in his own name with-
out joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is
brought . . ."7 (1) The suit by a union for a right that is "primarily
for the benefit of the individual employee" fits the third party beneficiary
situation. The Supreme Court has held that "an employee becomes
entitled by virtue of the Labor Relations Act somewhat as a third party
beneficiary to all benefits of the collective trade agreement. . . ." (2)
Section 301(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act gives the union the right to sue
for the benefit of the employee.9
The Westinghouse limitation of section 301 (a) to suits wherein the
union is primarily interested has been repeatedly applied by the lower
federal courts. Several cases have held that suits to enforce agreements
to maintain union shops and check-off of union dues are primarily a
union concern, and federal jurisdiction is allowed. 10 However, federal
'348 U.S. at 461.
'Osaka Shosen Kaisha Line v. United States, 300 U.S. 98 (1937).
'Bunn, Lincoln Mills and the Jurisdiction to Enforce Collective Bargaining
Agreenments, 43 VA. L. Rxv. 1247 (1957).7FFD. R. Civ. P. 17(a).8 J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 336 (1944).
' This section says, "Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an
entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the
United States." Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) § 301(b), 61
Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1952).
'o United Steelworkers v. Knoxville Iron Co., 162 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Tenn.
1958); Burlesque Artists Ass'n v. I. Hirst Enterprises, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 203
19591
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jurisdiction has been denied because of the "uniquely personal" rights of
the employee where the dispute involved extra work hours,1 discharge
of an employee who invoked the fifth amendment,12 and reduction of an
employee's pension allowance by the amount recovered under work-
men's compensation.' 3
None of the above cases were ones where there had been an agree-
ment between the union and the employer to arbitrate labor disputes.
It is now necessary to discuss how the presence of such an agreement
affects the restrictive Westinghouse interpretation of section 301(a).
Prior to 1957, it had been settled in the lower federal courts that when
there was an agreement to arbitrate, the union had standing to sue in
the federal courts to force a recalcitrant employer to submit the dispute
to arbitration.1 4  The union was held to be asserting its right to per-
formance of an agreement that governed the relation between the em-
ployer and the union, even if the dispute arose about a benefit "uniquely
personal" to the employee.
In 1957, the Supreme Court, in the case of Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln MillsU and its two companion cases,'( confirmed the holdings
of the lower federal courts that the union had standing to bring an
action for specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate. Section
301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act was held to afford federal jurisdiction
when the employer had refused to submit to arbitration, per the col-
lective bargaining agreement, a dispute about workloads and work
assignments.
The Lincoln Mills case did not overrule the Westinghouse dis-
tinction between "uniquely personal" and "union" causes of action. The
Court merely fitted the arbitration situation into the framework of the
distinction.17
(E.D. Pa. 1955); Durkin v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 11 F.R.D. 147
(S.D.N.Y. 1950); United Steel Workers v. Shakespeare Co., 84 F. Supp. 267(W.D. Mich. 1949).
"Burlesque Artists Ass'n v. I. Hirst Enterprises, Inc., supra note 10.
"2 United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers, Local 506 v. General Elec. Co., 231
F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied 352 U.S. 872 (1956).
"United Steelworkers v. Pullman-Standard Car Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 547 (3d
Cir. 1957).
" Local 19, Warehouse Workers Union v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 236 F.2d
776 (6th Cir. 1956) (arbitration of disputes over hours of work, wages and work-
ing conditions) ; Independent Petroleum Workers v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 235
F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1956) (arbitration of new salary rates when there has been
a new job classification); Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113
F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953) (arbitration of a dispute over separation pay).
"353 U.S. 448 (1957).
10 Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Workers, Local 1802, 353 U.S. 550
(1957) ; General Elec. Co. v. Local 205, United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers,
353 U.S. 547 (1957).
"7 United Steelworkers v. Pullman-Standard Mfg. Co. 241 F.2d 547, 549, 550
(3d Cir. 1957) ; Textile Workers Union v. Cone Mills Corp. 116 F. Supp. 654, 659(M.D.N.C. 1958).
[Vol. 37
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But the broad sweep of the opinions may indicate that the Court
was not entirely satisfied with the limitation on 301 (a).18 Moreover, the
fact that the decision was written by justice Douglas seems significant.
He was one of the dissenters in the Westinghouse case.19
The lower courts have not found the application of the Lincoln Mills
holding easy. In Textile Workers Union v. Bates Mfg. Co., 20 the union
sued for a wage increase purportedly authorized by the escalator clause
in its contract with the employer. Pursuant to the collective bargaining
agreement, the employer submitted to arbitration and there was an
award in his favor. He refused to pay because he had won the award.
The court held that since the arbitration agreement had been com-
pletely submitted to and refusal to pay was in compliance with the
award, there was nothing more asserted by the union than a suit for
wages, which was a "uniquely personal" right of the employees. Ac-
cordingly the court refused federal jurisdiction.21
In Textile Workers Union v. Cone Mills Corp.,2 2 a district court
sitting in North Carolina heard a case where there had been an arbitra-
tion award which decreed that the company must denominate a work
stoppage a "shut down," not a holiday or vacation. This decree re-
sulted in an award of unemployment benefits to the individual employees
involved. The employer, in violation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, refused to abide by the decree and award of the arbitrator. The
union, in the federal court, sought to force the employer to comply with
the award. The court refused jurisdiction. A distinction was drawn be-
tween an action to specifically enforce an agreement to submit to arbi-
tration, and enforcement of the terms of the award after the dispute
"8 The broadness of the dictum was recognized by the court in the Cone Mills
case. 166 F. Supp. 654, 658. One commentator on the case has said, "The reason-
ing applies as fully to the simple suit for money as to the more complex one for
arbitration." Bunn, Lincoln Mills and the Jurisdiction to Enforce Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements, 43 VA. L. REv. 1247, 1257 (1957).
" The only reference to the Westinghouse case is in the form of a non-
committal footnote by way of distinction. 353 U.S. 448, 456, n. 6. In the light
of Justice Douglas' former disapproval of the Westinghouse limitation on the
application of section 301 (a), it would seem that the footnote was added with
disapproval. All but three of the members of the court joined in this opinion.
The two concurring Justices, Burton and Harlan, seem more decidedly in favor
of the Westinghouse limitation. They said, "The District Court had jurisdiction
over the action since it involved an obligation running to a union-a union contro-
versy-and not uniquely personal rights of employees sought to be enforced by
a union." 353 U.S. 448, 460.
20 158 F. Supp. 410 (S.D. Me. 1958). Another case where there was a refusal
to arbitrate a dispute over the discharge of an employee followed Lincoln Mills
and allowed federal jurisdiction. Item Co. v. New Orleans Newspaper Guild, 256
F.2d 855 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 79 Sup. Ct 98 (1958).
"An alternative ground for dismissal of the union's action could have been
that the parties were hound to abide by the arbitrator's award. Such an award
is binding so long as the arbitrator has not exceeded 'his jurisdiction. Motor
Haulage Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 807, 272 App. Div.
382, 71 N.Y.S. 2d 352 (1st Dept. 1947).
" 166 F. Supp. 654 (M.D.N.C. 1958).
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has been submitted to arbitration and resolved. The former was held
to be a right of primary interest to the union and there is jurisdiction.28
But in the latter situation, federal jurisdiction was refused because the
individual employee in whose favor the award was given was the party
primarily interested.24
The Bates case had said that when there was complete compliance
with the agreement to submit to arbitration and the award of the
arbitrator the union no longer had a right to sue in the federal courts.
The Cone Mills case went a step further, and refused jurisdiction when
the employer had submitted to arbitration, but refused to abide by the
award.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in A. L. Kornman Co. v.
Antalgamated Clothing Workers,25 reached a contrary conclusion in a
case practically on "all fours" with Cone Mills. The employer had
refused to abide by the arbitration award which granted certain em-
ployees the disputed vacation pay. Holding that section 301 (a) of Taft-
Hartley conferred jurisdiction over the union's suit to enforce the award,
the court recognized the distinction enunciated in the Westinghouse
case, but held that the decision of the Supreme Court in Lincoh Mills
controlled this case. The court stated that it made no difference whether
the union sought the aid of the federal courts before or after submission
to arbitrate; if there had not been complete compliance with the collective
bargaining agreement section 301 (a) afforded jurisdiction. The Court
said,
If the United States District Courts have jurisdiction and may
order compliance with the grievance arbitration provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement, they must necessarily have juris-
diction to enforce the resulting awards. To hold otherwise would
render the entire arbitration machinery merely time-consuming
and useless. Authority to compel arbitration carries with it
authority to enforce the resulting award.26
This case held that jurisdiction would be allowed until there was as
complete compliance with the arbitration agreement as there was in the
Bates case. Mere submission to the award and refusal to abide thereby
was not sufficient to prevent federal jurisdiction, as held in the Cone
Mills case.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the distinction between "uniquely
personal" rights of the employee and those of the union is a questionable
" Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
"'Textile Workers Union v. Bates Mfg. Co., 158 F. Supp. 410 (S.D. Me.
1958).2264 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1959).20 Id. at 737.
[Vol. 37
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restriction on the extent to which section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley
Act confers federal jurisdiction. Legislative history does not indicate
that such a distinction was intended. Further, this distinction was the
result of the Courts wanting to avoid constitutional issues which have
now been resolved. Be this as it may, when this distinction is applied
to the arbitration situation, the courts should find that there is a "unique-
ly personal" right of the employee only after there has been submission
to arbitration and compliance with the award of the arbitrator. The
result of the Kornman case seems preferable to that of the Cone Mills
case.
JAMES W. KIRKPATRICK, JR.
Labor Law-FLSA-Extending "In Commerce" Coverage
In Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaghy & Associates,' the respondent was
an architectural and consulting engineering firm engaged in the prepara-
tion of plans and specifications for repair and construction of various in-
terstate facilities, including air bases, roads, turnpikes, bus terminals,
and radio and television installations. Also, it was engaged in the prep-
aration of plans for the construction of homes, shopping centers, and
commercial buildings. These plans and specifications consist of draw-
ings and information needed for the estimation of cost and guidance to
contractors in their bidding and in actual construction. The information
is gathered by fieldmen at the sites of the projects and transmitted to
the offices of the respondent. From this information draftsmen prepare
the plans under the supervision of professional engineers. In addition
to the draftsmen, clerks and stenographers also participate in the me-
chanical process of preparing the plans.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit2 held that the
draftsmen, fieldmen, clerks, and stenographers, as a group, were neither
"engaged in the production of goods for commerce" nor, because of the
local nature of the business, "engaged in commerce" so as to come within
the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.3 Under an almost
identical set of facts the Eighth Circuit in Mitchell v. Brown4 had held
that the employer's draftsmen, fieldmen, clerks, and stenographers, as a
group, were "engaged in commerce" and thus covered by the act. It was
1358 U.S. 207 (1959).
'250 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1957).
'Fair Labor Standards Act § 6(a), 52 STAr. 1060 (1938), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 206(a) (1958):
"Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who is engaged in com-
merce or in the production of goods for commerce wages at the following
rate. . ."
'244 F.2d 359 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955). Apparently
the only factual difference in the two cases was that in the Brown case an agent
of the defendant inspected the work of the contractor.
1959]
